

Message Text

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EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT USNATO 02027 ACTION SECSTATE INFO
BONN FEB 27.

QUOTE S E C R E T USNATO 02027

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR PAULS (FRG) AT
FEBRUARY 24 NAC CONSULTATION ON SALT

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF AMBASSADOR PAULS (FRG)
STATEMENT AS DELIVERED AT THE FEBRUARY 24 NAC
CONSULTATION ON SALT.

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BEGIN TEXT:

- STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR PAULS
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- AT THE COUNCIL MEETING ON 24TH FEBRUARY 1978

SUBJECT: SALT

1. WE THANK THE UNITED STATES FOR THIS RENEWED CHANCE FOR
A BROAD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON SALT WHICH IS A FURTHER
INTENSIFICATION OF OUR CONSULTATIONS. MY GOVERNMENT

APPRECIATES THE WILLINGNESS OF THE US ADMINISTRATION TO ENGAGE IN THIS DIALOGUE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO IT. MY GOVERNMENT IS OF THE OPINION THAT CONSULTATIONS ON SUCH A CENTRAL SUBJECT AS SALT OFFER A CHANCE FOR STRENGTHENING ALLIANCE COHESION EVEN FURTHER. WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING TO MAKE USE OF THIS CHANCE IN OUR COMMON INTEREST. WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT, FOLLOWING THIS MEETING, THERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CONSULTATIONS AMONG EXPERTS, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THIS KIND OF CONSULTATION IS USEFUL AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED. WE SHOULD ALSO TRY TO ENSURE THAT THE NECESSARY CONTINUITY IS MAINTAINED BETWEEN COUNCIL MEETINGS.

2. LET ME MAKE A FEW REMARKS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SALT PROBLEMS.

3. MY GOVERNMENT REGARDS SALT AS THE CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS ON MATTERS OF SECURITY POLICY AND AS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZATION IN THE NUCLEAR-STRATEGIC FIELD. THE EFFORTS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS ARE IN LINE WITH OUR COMMON INTERESTS. WE HOPE THAT SALT II CAN BE BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

4. I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS
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WITH REGARD TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION BY THE US DELEGATION:

5. WE HAVE NOTED WITH GREAT INTEREST THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THE TWO SIDES, ESPECIALLY AS FAR AS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WARHEADS IS CONCERNED. AFTER LISTENING TO THIS ASSESSMENT, WE CONSIDER IT JUSTIFIED TO SPEAK OF A ROUGH EQUIVALENCE. HOWEVER, WE HAVE TO CONSIDER THAT, WITH REGARD TO THE ASSESSMENT OF THE CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENCE, QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERCEPTION HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN ADDITION TO THE ACTUAL BALANCE OF POWER.

6. WE POINTED OUT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE PAST - NOT LEAST UNDER THIS ASPECT - THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT AND CODIFICATION OF NUCLEAR-STRATEGIC PARITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MAY LEAD TO A STRONGER ACCENT BEING PLACED ON THE DISPARITIES IN OTHER AREAS, PARTICULARLY IN THE MEDIUM-RANGE AND THE CONVENTIONAL FIELDS. THIS APPLIES ESPECIALLY IF THERE SHOULD BE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN FUTURE.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO THE FACT THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE NUCLEAR-STRATEGIC POTENTIAL WE HAVE WITH THE CRUISE MISSILES A DEVELOPED WESTERN SYSTEM OF A MEDIUM-RANGE CAPABILITY WHICH WILL BE SUBJECT TO A TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT, WHILE THE DEVELOPED SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE POTENTIALS ARE NOT COVERED. WE WOULD HAVE WELCOMED IT IF IT HAD BEEN FOUND POSSIBLE EITHER TO EXCLUDE ALL RANGES BELOW THE STRATEGIC LEVEL OR TO INCLUDE EASTERN SYSTEMS INTO THE TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS. THE INCLUSION OF CRUISE MISSILES INTO THE PROTOCOL MAKES IT NECESSARY TO KEEP THE CRUISE MISSILE OPTIONS - WHICH STILL REQUIRE VERY DETAILED EXAMINATION - OPEN FOR THE PERIOD AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THE PROTOCOL. THE EASTERN SIDE SHOULD
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NOT BE ENABLED TO REGARD THE CRUISE MISSILE ARRANGEMENTS AS A FINAL SOLUTION.

8. WE SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE TECHNICAL OPTIONS WILL REMAIN OPEN. WE PARTICULARLY WELCOME IT THAT OUR AMERICAN ALLIES HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SAFEGUARDING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR TESTING ALL TYPES OF CRUISE MISSILES UP TO A RANGE OF 2,500 KM. NOR DO WE DOUBT THE DETERMINATION OF OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS TO KEEP THE CRUISE MISSILE OPTIONS OPEN POLITICALLY AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THE THREE-YEAR PROTOCOL. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD MAKE USE OF THIS TIME TO ACHIEVE CLARITY ABOUT THE OPTIONS, CONCERNING DEFENSE AND NEGOTIATIONS, APPLYING TO THIS WEAPON SYSTEM WHICH IS OF SUCH IMPORTANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

9. THE PROBLEM OF THE DECLARATION OF INTENT IS ALSO OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. THIS DECLARATION WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT PRELIMINARY DECISIONS FOR LATER FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR A RADICAL SOLUTION FOR FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS AND THE INCLUSION IN SALT III OF WEAPON SYSTEMS HELD BY THIRD STATES HAS BEEN RAISED IN CONCRETE TERMS IN THE ARTICLE IN "PRAVDA" OF 11 FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR. THE DEMAND TO REFER TO THESE SUBJECTS IN A DECLARATION OF INTENT IS BEFORE US. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION INTENDS TO PUSH A DEFINITION OF THE TERM "STRATEGIC" WHICH WOULD BE IN HER INTEREST, THUS PLACING HER CONCEPT OF FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS INTO THE FOREGROUND. (ACCORDING TO THIS CONCEPT, THE TERM "STRATEGIC" WOULD REFER TO EVERYTHING THAT CAN REACH SOVIET TERRITORY, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHERE THE WEAPONS ARE LAUNCHED AND NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT A MAJOR
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PART OF THE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE POTENTIAL IS TARGETED ON EUROPE.) IN OUR VIEW, SALT III AND ANY GENERAL AGREEMENT PREPARING THE WAY TO SALT III, SUCH AS A DECLARATION OF INTENT, WILL HAVE TO BEAR THIS INTENTION IN MIND AND TAKE THE SOVIET NUCLEAR MEDIUM-RANGE POTENTIAL ADEQUATELY INTO ACCOUNT.

10. THE QUESTION OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION IS A SUBJECT WHICH, IN VIEW OF ITS SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES, IS BEST LEFT TO A DETAILED DISCUSSION BY THE EXPERTS WHO WILL MEET AFTER US. NEVERTHELESS, I WISH TO UNDERLINE HERE AND NOW THAT MY GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS PROBLEM. WE ARE AWARE - ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE ARTICLE IN "PRAVDA" OF 11 FEBRUARY - THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ADOPTED AN EXTREMELY INSISTENT ATTITUDE IN THIS RESPECT AND THAT SHE REGARDS IT AS A MAJOR POINT OF HER POLITICAL SALT II DEMANDS. SHE IS OBVIOUSLY AIMING AT THE FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS, THIRD-STATE SYSTEMS, ALLIANCE COOPERATION AND ESPECIALLY CRUISE MISSILES.

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11. WE WELCOME THE DETERMINATION OF THE US ADMINISTRATION TO REJECT THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR A NON-TRANSFER CLAUSE AS WELL AS ITS PREPAREDNESS - WHICH HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY STATED - TO CONSULT THE ALLIANCE FULLY IN THIS QUESTION BEFORE ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS TAKE PLACE.

12. WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED IT IF A SALT II AGREEMENT HAD NOT CONTAINED A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE. OUR CONCERN IS NOT SO MUCH OF A JURIDICAL BUT OF A POLITICAL NATURE. WE ARE, OF COURSE, AWARE THAT BILATERAL TREATIES WHICH ARE TO THE DETRIMENT OF A THIRD PARTY ARE IMPOSSIBLE. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD LIKE TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE COULD BE USED AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR TURNING

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UPSIDE DOWN THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETATION OF ANY AGREEMENT LIKE SALT, I.E. THAT WHAT HAS NOT BEEN EXPLICITLY FORBIDDEN IS PERMITTED. THIS MIGHT HAVE THE RESULT THAT, BY INVOKING THE SPIRIT OR THE PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET UNION MAY PUT FORWARD DEMANDS IN FIELDS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN EXPLICITLY SETTLED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF.

PARTICULARLY, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE DOES NOT PROVIDE THE SOVIET UNION WITH AN INSTRUMENT BY MEANS OF WHICH SHE CAN EXERT POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE ALLIANCE (MORE SPECIFICALLY: ON POLITICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE).

13. ALREADY IN AUGUST 1977, WE PUT FORWARD OUR DOUBTS CONCERNING THE SUPPLEMENTARY FORMULA WHICH WAS THEN INTRODUCED IN THE ALLIANCE. THESE DOUBTS HAVE MEANWHILE BECOME MUCH STRONGER. I SHOULD LIKE TO CALL ATTENTION ESPECIALLY TO TWO ELEMENTS OF OUR CONSIDERATIONS:

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- A NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA WHICH CONTAINS A REFERENCE TO THIRD STATES WOULD IN OUR OPINION INTRODUCE ELEMENTS OF NON-TRANSFER. SUCH A REFERENCE SHOULD THEREFORE BE AVOIDED.

- WE HAVE POINTED OUT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT WE CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT A NON-CIRCUMVENTION ARRANGEMENT - EVEN IF IT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY REFERENCE TO THIRD STATES - SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN AMERICAN INTERPRETATION.

14. THESE ARE SOME REMARKS OF A FUNDAMENTAL NATURE
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WHICH ARE MOTIVATED BY THE CONVICTION THAT OUR COMMON DEFENCE EFFORTS SHOULD BE MATCHED BY COMMON EFFORTS FOR ARMS CONTROL. WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN THIS SENSE. END TEXT. GLITMAN
UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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